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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ZION FIRST NATIONAL BANK 
' 
-vs.-
HAROLD A. CARLSON and 
M. E. HARRIS, JR., 
Plaintiff, 
Defendants. 




ZIONS SECURITIES CORPORATION, 




Third Party Defendant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case 
No. 11,636 
M. E. Harris, Jr., one of two defendants in an action 
brought by plaintiff bank on four promissory notes, filed a 
third party complaint against Zions Securities Corporation 
and Artcol Corporation to foreclose an alleged mechanic's 
lien for architectural services. Zions Securities Corporation 
defended separately from Artcol Coroporation. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LO\VER COURT 
M. E. Harris, Jr., third party plaintiff, obtained summary 
judgment against Artcol Corporation, one of third party de-
fendants, October 5, 1966, for $212,350.00 for architectural 
services, and a decree of foreclosure of all right, title and 
interest of Artcol Corporation. ( R. 66-68). 
On the issues of fact and of law between M. E. Harris, 
Jr., and Zions Securities Corporation, the other third party 
defendant, a pre-trial conference and a trial were conducted 
by the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, District Judge, on 
December 12, 1968. Findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
foreclosure decree and judgment dated April 7, 1969, were 
entered on April 23, 1969, in favor of M. E. Harris, Jr. against 
Zions Securities Corporation. ( R. 131-139). By such fore-
closure decree and judgment appealed from, Zions Securities 
Corporation was adjudged to be indebted to M. E. Harris, Jr. 
in the principal sum of $159,262.50 plus $31,852.40 interest, 
plus $19,000.00 attorney fees, or a total of $210,114.90; said 
amount was adjudged to be secured by Harris' mechanic's 
lien upon described lands; Zions Securities was thereby fore-
closed of all right and title to said lands; "said mortgaged 
property" was ordered sold by the Sheriff of Salt Lake 
County, with judgment to be entered for any deficiency. 
(R. 137-139). 
RELIEF SOUGHT BY APPEAL 
Appellant Zions Securities Corporation seeks (a) reversal 
of the foreclosure decree and judgment in its entirety; ( b) 
an adjudication that Zions Securities never became indebted 
to M. E. Harris, Jr. in any sum or amount, and that the 
"Notice of Lien" filed by M. E. Harris, Jr. was and is null 
and void as to Zions Securities; and ( c) that appellant have 
judgment against M. E. Harris, Jr. of "no cause of action," 
and for recovery of appellant's costs. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Since about 1960 Zions Securities Corporation has been 
the owner in fee of land on the east side of "A" Street be-
tween South Temple Street and First Avenue in Salt Lake 
City. ( R. 205). There was a home on that land which had a 
rental value of about $100.00 per month. (R. 205-206, 221). 
Under date of June 26, 1963, Zions Securities Corpora-
tion, as fee owner, designated as "landlord," and Artcol Corp-
poration, designated as "Tenant," executed a "Ground Lease" 
covering the real estate, Exhibit 21, for a term of 85 years, 
subject to terms and conditions, including payment of rent. 
For the first 45 years the rental was to be based on 6% of the 
appraisal or reappraisal of the land only. By paragraph 7 of 
the Ground Lease is was provided that "ARTCOL, at its 
own cost and expense, may at its option, erect and construct 
a building or buildings, structure or structures, or other im-
provements," etc. By paragraph 16 it was provided that 
whenever Artcol was not in arrears of rent nor in default 
"ARTCOL, or its assigness or sublessess, may mortgage its or 
their estate or its or their interest therein to secure a bona 
fide loan or loans of money," etc. By paragraph 26 it was 
provided: 
" 0 0 0 the TENANT is authorized to obtain a loan, 
the repayment of which is to be insured by the Federal 
Housing Commissioner and secured by a mortgage on this 
leasehold estate. TENANT is further authorized to execute 
a mortgage on this leasehold and otherwise to comply 
with the requirements of the Federal Housing Commis-
sioner for obtaining such an insured mortgage loan; pro-
vided, however, that the LANDLORD shall not be re-
quired to mortgage the real property." 
By paragraph 30 it was specified: "The LANDLORD 
agrees that, within ten ( 10 days after receipt of written re-
quest from TENANT, it will join in any and all applications 
for permits, licenses or other authorizations required by any 
governmental or other body claiming jurisdiction in connec-
tion with any work which the TENANT may do hereunder," 
etc. There were restrictive covenants in the lease. Substantial 
portions of the lengthy Ground Lease are set forth in Appen-
dix "A." 
M. E. Harris, Jr., third party plaintiff, testified at the trial 
that he has been licensed in Utah to practice as an architect 
since 1946; that he was associated with Harold A. Carlson of 
Los Angeles in "a partnership or a joint venture" for a pro-
posed apartment building to be built on the land; that Artcol 
Corporation commissioned them to draw plans and specifi-
cations and to do the other architectural work for a proposed 
building to be known as "Plaza Terrace Apartment Building." 
( R. 177-179). The written contract, Exhibit 2, designated, 
"A STANDARD FORM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
O\VNER AND ARCHITECT," dated August 6, 1963, was 
executed by Artcol Corporation as "Owner" and by M. E. 
Harris, Jr. and Harold A. Carlson as "Architect." Said Exhibit 
2 provided for a total fee of $212,.350.00. Said contract de-
fined the "BASIC SERVICES OF THE ARCHITECT," 
under headings of Schematic Design Phase, Design Develop-
ment Phase, Construction Documents Phase, and Construc-
tion Phase including general supervision of construction. 
Artcol was to make payments as follows: 
"Seventy-five percent ( 75%) of the fee shall be paid to 
the Architect when plans have been approved by F.H.A. 
and loan recorded for construction. The remaining twenty-
five percent ( 25%) balance shall be paid proportionately 
with each contractors draw during the construction phase." 
It was stipulated at the trial that "no loan was ever re-
corded for constructiou." ( R. 177). At the pretrial conference 
it was "stipulated that no lmil<ling was constructed on the 
premises as a result of tllf' third party plaintiff's architectural 
services." ( R. 173). At tht· trial it was stipulated that "There 
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has been no building on this property" and that the "lot is 
presently vacant. (R. 221). 
To finance their architectural work, between February 
and October 1964 the architects jointly borrowed $95,000.00 
from Zions First National Bank and signed notes to cover the 
loans. Those are the notes which plaintiff bank brought suit 
on in this case. (R. 1-7). To secure payment of those notes, 
by Exhibit 3 dated February 13, 1964, Carlson and Harris 
assigned to the bank as collateral security their contract with 
Artcol Corporation dated August 6, 1963, Exhibit 2. ( R. 179-
180). Artcol Corporation had to sign every check which was 
issued. Zions Securities did not sign any of the notes, was not 
a party to the loan transactions, and never received any of 
the money. (R. 179-180, 201). 
Harold A. Carlson, partner of third party plaintiff M. E. 
Harris, Jr., or his joint adventurer, did a substantial part of 
the architectural work. He was involved principally in prep-
aration of the specifications, Exhibit 11. ( R. 169-171, 198). 
Carlson did part of his work in California. He was in Salt 
Lake City part of the time. His name was on the office door 
along with that of Harris. They discussed many things about 
the project. ( R. 202-203). 
M. E. Harris, Jr. testified that Zions Securities did not 
ask him to prepare any drawings. He answered "No" to the 
question: "Did Zions Securities Corporation at any time enter 
into a contract with you?" (R. 198-199). 
Harris identified various exhibits. He said he requested 
that soil tests be made. Exhibit 13 is a report of soil analysis 
made by a firm of consulting engineers, dated March 3, 1964. 
A drill rig took core samples in depth ranging from 30 to 80 
feet. ( R. 191-192). Harris testified that Artcol Corporation 
paid for that work. ( R. 200). 
Exhibit 14 shows location of structures off the property. 
Exhibit 15 is a topographic survey showing location of 2-story 
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brick and stone house, with walks, fronting on First Avenue. 
Exhibit 16 is a topographic survey showing contours and 
elevations. The survey plats show they were made for Artcol 
Corporation by D. H. Brammer & Co., Engineers. Harris 
testified that he requested those surveys, and that Artcol Cor-
poration paid for them. ( R. 192-193, 200). 
Harris testified that he suggested that structures on the 
land be demolished. He recommended to Artcol Corporation 
names of specialty contractors who could do that work. He 
said that Artcol Corporation paid for the demolition. (R. 200-
201). The demolition occurred in mid 1964. ( R. 193). Gra-
ham H. Doxey, manager of Zions Securities, saw the house 
on the leased land being torn down. He never objected nor 
gave permission to Artcol Corporation for such demolition. 
( R. 217). It was stipulated that if called as a witness, Taylor 
would testify that the reasonable rental value of that 
house was $100.00 per month (which was demolished in 
1964). (R. 221). 
Harris testified that it was necessary to file a request for 
variance and for a hearing with the board of adjustment be-
cause the design of the proposed building did not meet the 
existing zoning requirements. Harris said he prepared Exhibit 
5, a notice of zoing appeal and obtained Doxey's signature 
on it. Harris told Doxey it was necessary for Doxey to sign 
it because of the city requirement for the property owner to 
sign the application for variance. (R. 185-187, 196-197). The 
first hearing was in September 1963. ( R. 187). Exhibit 6 is 
the decision on appeal dated November 4, 1963, granting the 
variance on condition that construction start in six months. 
The minutes incorporated into the decision recite that "Mr. 
Jorgensen explained that the appeal is in the name of Zions 
Seecurities because they are the owners of the property, but 
it has been leased to Artcol Corporation, who are building 
the building." 
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The variance lapsed and a second hearing was held in 
January 1965. Harris said he prepared the application and 
asked Doxey to sign it. By that time the working plans and 
specifications were essentially completed, Exhibits 10 and 11. 
( R. 187-191). Exhibit 22 is a letter signed by Graham H. 
Doxey for Zions Securities to the board of adjustment, Janu-
ary 5, 1965, stating: "the developers to whom we have leased 
the property have been working through their architect, 
Mr. M. E. Harris, to complete the plans and also to work 
out the building and development program." 
In September 1965 there was a later hearing. Harris said 
it was detected by the zoning staff that on one corner of the 
proposed building there would be a wall too high for the 
setback and some balconies projecting into the side and rear 
yards in violation of the ordinance. He prepared an applica-
tion for the proposed variance and had Doxey sign it. Exhibit 
8 is a copy of the decision on appeal dated September 7, 
1965. The request for variance for balconies on "A" Street 
was denied, but the other variance was granted. The minutes 
in the decision show no one present from Zions Securities; 
but tha t"Mr. M. E. Harris, Jr., architect, and Weston S. 
Taylor, representing Artcol Corporation, were present. Mr. 
Taylor presented a letter of authorization from C. E. LaBrae, 
President of Artcol Corporation, who are building the struc-
ture." 
In August 1963 at the suggestion of Artcol Corporation, 
Harris said he showed to the manager of Zions Securities, 
Exhibit 4, the preliminary design drawings. Harris was not 
sure of the exact words, but Doxey said, "This looks like a 
good way to handle the site situation. It's a good place for 
parking." Harris said, "He approved of that with thought, I 
felt." (R. 183-184). Doxey never signed any approval. ( R. 
195-196) Harris said he did not leave Exhibit 4 with Doxey. 
Harris testified that he never delivered any plans or specifi-
cations to any one at Zions Securities Corporation. ( R. 201 ). 
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The name-plate on each sheet of the working plans, Ex-
hibit 10 states: "APARTMENT BUILDING FOR ARTCOL 
CORPORATION," and names "Harold A. Carlson, A.I.A., 
Los Angeles," and "M. E. Harris, Jr., A.I.A., Salt Lake City," 
as "Architects." The specifications, Exhibit 11 designates Art-
col Corporation as "Owner." There is a place for signatures 
approving the specifications, but no place for the signature 
of Zions Securities. Exhibits 10 and 11 were essentially com-
pleted by January 1965. ( R. 190-191). 
Artcol Corporation filled application for F. H. A. commit-
ment for an insured mortgage for $3,506,000, August 18, 
1964. (R. 174-177). The F. H. A. commitment was issued to 
Zions First National Bank on June 23, 1965. (R. 174-175). 
The commitment expired after four short extensions. The 
local F. H. A. office on April 22, 1966, received a memo from 
Washington stating that the "commitment in this case which 
expired on April 17, 1966, may not be re-opened." ( R. 175). 
Zions Securities had no dealings with F.H.A. (R. 216-217). 
Harris testified that he was not paid any money by Artcol 
Corporation on the contract, Exhibit 2. He said he had not 
been paid by any one for the plans and specifications. ( R. 
203-204). He testified that he never delivered any plans and 
specifications to any one at Zions Securities Corporation. 
(R. 201). 
Exhibit 19 is the "Notice of Lien," bearing the signature 
of M. E. Harris, Jr. ( R. 194). He acknowledged his signature 
November 16, 1965. It was not verified under oath. A copy 
of Exhibit 19 is attached to the third party complaint. (R. 12-
13). Zions Securities first filed motions to dismiss. By answer 
a number of defenses were asserted, including "failure to 
state a claim for relief." ( R. 2.5-43). By paragraph 21 of the 
answer it is alleged: "Said notice of lien dated November 16, 
1965, was null and void, and the same was not subject to re-
cordation under the law." ( R. 40). There was no assignment 
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of any kind from Carlson to Harris at the time Exhibit 19 
was filed, nor until more than two years after Harris filed his 
third party complaint. Exhibit 1 is the assignment from Carl-
son dated July 1, 1968. It was obtained "with the help of Mr. 
LaBrae of Artcol Corporation." ( R. 199-200). 
Counsel for Harris stated: "As to Mr. Carlson, we will 
stipulate that he may claim an interest in the proceeds; that 
the partnership has never been wound up, though long ago 
dissolved." (R. 200). 
In the pre-trial order dictated December 12, 1968, it was 
stated: 
"It is agreed by the third party plaintiff that he is not 
proceeding under the theory of an implied contract, but 
rather under the theory that the services were performed 
'at the instance and request' on the part of the third party 
defendant, as those terms are used in the statute." 
"It is stipulated that no building was constructed on 
the premises as a result of the third party plaintiff's archi-
tectural services." ( R. 127, 172-173). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE "FORECLOSURE DECREE AND JUDG-
MENT" AGAINST ZIONS SECURITIES, THE 
LANDLORD AND FEE OWNER, IS CONTRARY 
TO THE EVIDENCE AND WITHOUT AUTHOR-
ITY OF LAW, FOR ZIONS SECURITIES CORPOR-
ATION AS "LANDLORD" NEITHER REQUESTED 
ANY SERVICES OF THE ARCHITECTS NOR 
GRANTED ARTCOL CORPORATION AS "TEN-
ANT" AUTHORITY TO SUBJECT THE FEE TITLE 
OF LANDLORD TO ANY MECHANIC'S LIEN 
FOR ARCHITECTURAL SERVICES. 
It was undisputed that (a) the architects entered into 
written contract for architectural services only with the Ten-
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ant, Exhibit 2; (b) the architects never furnished the Land-
lord any plans and specifications; ( c) the Tenant never con-
summated any construction loan nor awarded any contract 
for construction of a new building; and ( d) no building nor 
other improvement was ever constructed upon the land 
covered by the Ground Lease, Exhibit 21. 
Two of the factual and legal issues in the case were: 
( 1) Inasmuch as third party plaintiff M. E. Harris, Jr., 
and his partner Harold A. Carlson executed Exhibit 2 for 
architectural services solely with the Tenant, Artcol Corpor-
ation, whether Zions Securities Corporation by the terms of 
the "Ground Lease, Exhibit 21, or otherwise, authorized the 
Tenant to subject the fee title of the Landlord to any lien 
for architectural services. 
(2) Whether the architects performed services at the 
"instance and request of Zions Securities Corporation" so as 
to create an indebtedness which could be secured by a lien 
against the fee title of the Landlord. 
Sec. 38-1-3, U. C. A. 1953, specifies: 
"Contractors, subcontractors and all persons perform-
ing labor upon, or furnishing materials to be used in, the 
construction or alteration of, or addition to, or repair of, 
any building, structure or improvement upon land; '* '* '* 
and licensed architects and engineers and artisans who 
have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, 
drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, 
or who have rendered other like professional service, or 
bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the property upon 
or concerning which they have rendered service, per-
formed labor or furnished materials, for the value of the 
service rendered, labor performed or materials furnished 
by each respectively, whether at the instance of the 
owner or of any other person acting by his authority as 
agent, contractor or otherwise. Such liens shall attach 
only to such interest as the owner may have in the pro-
perty, '* '* '* ." (Emphasis added). 
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As pointed out in Buehner Block Co. v. Nick Glezos, 6 
Utah 2d 226, 310 P. 2d 517 at 520, the lessees who ordered 
the building materials were owners within the meaning of 
the statute: 
"As to defendants' contention that the mechanics' 
liens could not be foreclosed against his interest, it is 
well settled that a lessee is an owner within the meaning 
of the mechanics' liens statutes, and his interest is subject 
to a lien for improvements made under contract with 
him. This lien may attach to and be enforced against his 
leasehold estate for labor or materials furnished under an 
express or implied contract with the lessee." 
In his third party complaint, M. E. Harris, Jr. alleged; 
"2. That on or about the 6th day of August, 1963, at 
the special instance and request of Zions Securities Corp-
poration, Artcol Corporation employed third party plain-
tiff M. E. Harris, Jr., to perform professional architec-
tural services and prepare plans, drawings and specifica-
tions with respect to a proposed apartment building." 
( R. 9. Emphasis added). 
It was specified in the pre-trial order dictated December 
12, 1968: 
"It is agreed by the Third Party Plaintiff that he is 
not proceeding under the theory of an implied contract, 
but rather under the theory that the services were per-
formed "at the instance and request' on the part of the 
Third Party Defendant [Zions Securities Corporation], as 
those terms are used in the statute." (R. 127, 172-193. 
Emphasis added). 
By Harris' unverified "Notice of Lien," Exhibit 19, he 
made no claim that any architectural services had been per-
formed at the "instance and request" of Zions Securities, but 
he represented that the services were "furnished to the own-
ers and to the premises" described "pursuant to a contract 
with Artcol Corporation," which was the Tenant. Said con-
tract was Exhibit 2. The prejudicial error of admitting Ex-
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hibit 19 in evidence because it is void on its face for it never 
was verified as required by law, is discussed under Point VI. 
M. E. Harris, Jr. answered "No" to the question: "Did 
Zions Securities Corporation at any time enter into a contract 
with you?" ( H. 199). Harris admitted that Zions Securities 
did not ask him to prepare any drawings. (R. 198-199). He 
did not testify that Zions Securities ever asked him to per-
form any services, or ever promised to pay him anything. 
Harris testified that he never delivered any plans and specifi-
cations to any one at Zions Securities Corporation. ( R. 201). 
At the pre-trial it was "stipulated that no building was con-
structed on the premises as a result of the third party plain-
tiff's architectural services." ( R. 127, 173). At the trial it was 
stipulated that no building has been built and that the land 
is vacant. (R. 221). 
There was an utter lack of proof (a) that Zions Secur-
ities, the Landlord, by the "Ground Lease," Exhibit 21, or 
otherwise, requested Artcol Corporation, the Tenant, to 
employ Harris and Carlson (or either of them) as architects, 
or ( b) that any architectural services were performed by 
Harris and Carlson (or by either of them) "at the instance 
and request" of Zions Securities. There was no evidence that 
Artcol, the Tenant, ever was made the agent of the Landlord 
with authority to subject the fee title of the Landlord to any 
liens for any indebtedness incurred by the Tenant. 
Notwithstanding the express disclaimer of any theory of 
"implied contract" at the pre-trial, and the complete failure 
of proof on the part of Harris of the claims asserted at the 
pre-trial, among other prejudicial errors the trial court made 
finding of fact No. 10. Not only is such finding unsupported 
by the evidence, but it is an unwarranted conclusion of law 
which misconstrues and C\ en contradicts the express lan-
guage of the exhibits to which is refers, which were intro-
duced in evidence hy Hanis l1imself: 
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. "10'. That third party defendant impliedly author-
ized said architectural services and subsequently ratified 
same and gave the lessee implied authority to bind les-
sor's interest with respect to said services, and sub-
sequently ratified lessee's acts by: 
" ( a) The provisions of the option to lease and lease 
(Exhibits 20 & 21); 
"(b) Approval of the preliminary sketches (Exhibit 
4); 
" ( c) Execution of zoning variance applications and 
appearances and participation in zoning hearings (Ex-
hibits 5, 6, 7 & 8); 
" ( d) Approval of said architectural services (Exhibit 
22) ." ( R. 133.) Emphasis added. 
None of the exhibits referred to can be construed ration-
ally to have "impliedly authorized said architectural ser-
vices" if such finding means that Zions Securities requested 
Artcol as Tenant to employ said architects or agreed to pay 
them for their services. Nor could said exhibits be con-
strued reasonably to show that the Landlord ratified and as-
sumed any obligations of the Tenant. Nor did any of those 
exhibits give the Tenant "implied authority to bind lessor's 
interest with respect to said services." Even if there had 
been an issue of "implied contract instead of an express dis-
claimer, there was no evidence of "implied contract." 
As to " ( a) The provisions of the option to lease and lease 
(Exhibits 20 & 21) ": There was no language in either the 
"Option to Ground Lease," Exhibit 20, or in the "Ground 
Lease," Exhibit 21, which gave Artcol Corporation even any 
"implied authority" to bind the interests of Zions Securities 
for any costs or expenses of architectural services contracted 
by Artcol under Exhibit 2 or otherwise. The "Option to 
Ground Lease" dated January 3, 1963, expired June 15, 1963. 
There was no evidence that any activities of any kind took 
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place on the land during the option period. Exhibit 20 incor-
porated by reference the "Ground Lease attached hereto and 
made a part of this option," but the attachment is missing. 
Consequently, the terms of the GROUND LEASE dated 
June 26, 1963, Exhibit 21, executed by Zions Securieties 
Corporation as "Landlord" and by Artcol Corporation as 
"Tenant," must be scrutinized. 
This Ground Lease, Exhibit 21, was for a maximum term 
of 85 years. By paragraph 1 the annual rental was to be 
$18,000 per year for the first 29 years, such minimum annual 
rental to continue to the 45th year, or "6% of the value of the 
land only" as appraised or reappraised in subsequent years. 
The Ground Lease did not require Artcol to build any build-
ing nor any other structure nor to make any improvement at 
any time or in any amount. Paragraph 7 specified that "ART-
CO L, at its own cost and expense, may at its option, erect 
and construct a building or building, structure or structures," 
etc. Artcol had no obligation to make any improvement. Par-
agraph 16 provided that "ARTCOL, or its assignees or sub-
lessees, may mortgage its or their estate or its or their inter-
est therein to secure a bona fide loan or loans of money then 
actually made or then actually about to be made to ART-
COL." Exhibit 21 will be searched in vain for any language 
which could be construed to grant Artcol authority to sub-
ject the title of the Landlord to any mortgage or other lien. 
Such a concept was expressly negatived. By paragraph 26 
the Tenant was "authorized to execute a mortgage on this 
leasehold and otherwise to comply with the requirements of 
the Federal Housing Commissioner for obtaining such an in-
sured mortgage loan," but "the LANDLORD shall not be re-
quired to mortgage the real property." By the express terms 
of the Ground Lease the Tenant could subject only its own 
leasehold interests to lien, but not the interest of the Land-
lord. Substantial portions of the Ground Lease are quoted 
verbatim in Appendix "A." 
15 
The rule is that where the fee owner gives consent to the 
lessee to make improvments to the land on condition that 
lessee shall pay for all labor and materials, the lessee does 
not thereby become the agent of the landlord so as to sub-
ject the title of the fee owner to a mechanic's lien. 
In an early Washington case, Stetson-Post Mill Co. v. 
Brown, 59 P. 507, it was held that the lessee did not become 
the agent of the landlord to subject the land to a lien for 
improvements by the lessee, where the lease gave lessee the 
privilege of building a brick building which would conform 
with the requirements of a city ordinance, although at the 
end of the lease the building would become the property of 
the lessor without indemnification. 
In Miles v. Bunn, (Wash.) 22 P. 2d 985, it was held that 
where the lessee was not obligated to construct a building, 
but had the privilege of doing so, the lessee was not the 
lessor's agent, so as to entitle laborers and materialmen to 
liens on the lessor's property rights. To the same effect are 
the following cases: 
Sewell, etc. v. Nu Markets, Inc. 353 Mich. 553, 91 N. W. 
2d 861. 
Perkins Fuel & Supply Co. v. Rosenberg, (Iowa), 282 
N. W. 371. 
Thorson v. Maxwell Hardware Co., (S. D.), 146 N. W. 
2d 739. 
Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Korth, Executrix, 37 Wis. 2d 
531, 155 N. W. 2d 662. (50-50 share cropper). 
Backsteader v. Berry Hill Bldg. Corp., 228 N. Y. S. 2d 
850. (Distinguishes between mere consent to improve and a 
contractual duty which legally obligates the lessee to im-
prove). 
Lorenz v. Pilsener Brewing Co., (Or.) 81 P. 2d 104. 
In Deka Development Co. v. Fox, (Okl.), 39 P. 2d 143, 
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it was held that the interest of the lessor is not subjected to 
liens for improvements made by the lessee unless the owner 
is obligated by the terms of the lease to reimburse the tehant 
for those improvements. 
The rule as to nonliability of the fee owner for improve-
ments made by the lessee, is analogous to the rule of non-
liability of the vendor of real estate for improvements made 
by the purchaser under an executory contract of sale. In 
Utah the interest of the vendor is not subject to any lien re-
sulting from improvemnts made by the vendee, unless liens 
on the estate of vendor are authorized by the vendor. As 
stated in Burton-Walker Lumber Co. v. Howard, 92 Utah 92, 
66 P. 2d 134: 
"Appellant cites the case of Belnap v. Condon, 34 
Utah 213, 97 P. 111, 23 L. R. A. ( N.S.) 601, as authority 
for the proposition that the interest of the vendor cannot 
be subjected to mechanic's liens unless the vendor con-
sents either through ratification or by giving the vendee 
implied or express authority to bind him. There is no 
question about this principle." 
In Belnap v. Condon, 34 Utah 213, 97 P. 111, the Court 
made some observations which are applicable to the ground 
lease in this case, Exhibit 21: 
" 
0 0 0 The mere expectation by the owner and ven-
dor of the land that the purchaser will make improve-
ments upon it and in that way enhance its value is not 
sufficient to establish the relation of principal and agent 
between the vendor and vendee. Nor do we think that 
mere permission by the vendor to the vendee to make 
improvements would be sufficient, and certainly mere 
knowledge or acquiescence on the part of the owner is 
not sufficient under statute. 0 0 0 • 
" 
0 0 0 No doubt, when one purchases land of any 
kind, he has at least the implied power to improve it in 
his own way. If he does so upon his own responsibility, 
it is not easy to perceive how, in the absence of an ex-
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press statute, he thereby binds the owner of the title for 
the value of the improvements. Nor do we think it 
changes the rnle if the owner either expresses his assent 
to the making of the improvements or permits them to be 
made without objection. In either case the necessary 
authority required by our statute in the vendee from the 
vendor to bind the vendor's interest in the property is 
lacking. 0 0 0 ." 
The balance of Finding of Fact No. 10 also is unsup-
ported by the evidence. The purported "(b) Approval of the 
preliminary sketches (Exhibit 4) ," was the unwarranted con-
clusion of Harris. Harris testified that in August 1963, at the 
suggestion of Artcol Corporation, he took the preliminary 
design drawings to Graham H. Doxey, manager of Zions 
Securities, Exhibit 4. Harris was not sure of the exact words, 
but Doxey said, "This looks like a good way to handle the 
site situation. It's a good place for parking." It was Harris' 
conclusion that Doxey "approved of that with thought, I felt." 
( R. 183-184). Harris testified that he did not leave the pre-
liminary drawings with Doxey. He said they showed no de-
tail whatsoever and that they could not be used to constrnct 
a building. ( R. 182, 201). Doxey testified that he never was 
asked to approve any plans and never did approve any plans 
nor ask Artcol Corporation for the right to approve any of 
the plans. (R. 218). We note that 9 of the sheets were dated 
November 1963. The alleged "approval" was supposed to 
have occurred in August 1963. How could Zions Securities 
"approve" Exhibit 4 in August 1963, when most of the sheets 
did not come into existence until the following November? 
Harris admitted that Doxey never signed any "approval." 
(R. 195-196). 
Harris admitted that he never delivered any plans or spe-
cifications to any one at Zions Securities Corporation. ( R. 
201). There was no place on the working plans, Exhibit 10, 
or on the specifications for any approval by Zions Securities. 
The plate in the lower right-hand corner of Exhibit 4 (the 
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preliminary sketches), and on each sheet of Exhibit 10, the 
working drawings, shows that the architects prepared the 
plans for Artcol Corporation. The name-plate states: 
"APARTMENT BUILDING FOR ARTCOL CORPORA-
TION," and names "Harold A. Carlson, A.I.A., Los Angeles," 
and "M. E. Harris, Jr., A.I.A., Salt Lake City,'' as "Archi-
tects." Zions Securities Corporation was not even mentioned 
on Exhibit 2, or Exhibits 4, 10 and 11. The caption sheet on 
the specifiications, Exhibit 11, states: 
"PLAZA TO\VER APARTMENT BUILDING 
"Federal Housing Administration Project Number 
105-00032 
"Project Address: 210 First Avenue, Salt Lake City 
"ARCHITECTS HAROLD A. CARLSON, 
A.l,A., Los Angeles, Calif. 
M. E. HARRIS, JR., A.I.A., 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
"OWNER ARTCOL CORPORATION 
"MORTGAGEE ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL 
BANK 
"MORTGAGE INSURER FEDERAL HOUSING AD-
MINISTRATION." 
\Vithin those specifications, Exhibit 11, there are places 
for signatures evidencing approval by all persons named 
therein. There is no place for approval by Zions Securities 
Corporation. The plans and specifications clearly show that 
the architects knew they had contracted to perform services 
only to Artcol, the Tenant. Zions Securities was not even 
mentioned as would have been the case if its approval had 
been required. 
Harris made no claim that Zions Securities ever approved 
the working drawings, Exhibit 10, or the specifications, Ex-
hibit 11. Zions Securities was not even furnished copies of 
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such documents. The fact is that Zions Securities as Land-
lord did not reserve any right to choose the architects or to 
control the activities of the architects, or to approve or reject 
the plans and specifications or any other work products, in 
the event the Tenant, Artcol Corporation, decided to erect 
a building or to make any other improvement on the land 
covered by the Ground Lease, Exhibit 21. Zions Securities 
did not hire and it could not fire the architects. The archi-
tects did not acknowledge any duties to Zions Securities. 
There was no competent evidence to support the unwar-
ranted conclusion in finding No. 10 that " ( c) Execution of 
zoning variance applications and appearance and participa-
tion in zoning hearings (Exhibits 5, 6, 7 & 8) ," "impliedly 
authorized" or "ratified" the architectural services of Harris. 
Harris never pretended that Zions Securities ever requested 
either of the architests to perform any services. Quite the 
opposite. Harris requested Zions Securities to sign several 
applications for zoning variance and zoing appeal. He testi-
fied that the design of the proposed building for Artcol did 
not meet existing zoning requirements. In order to get ap-
proval of the plans by the zoning commission, it would be 
necessary to obtain a zoning variance. Harris said he dis-
cussed proposed variances with Doxey. (R. 185-186). Harris 
admitted that he told Doxey it was necessary to file applica-
tion for zoning variance in the name of Zions Securities be-
cause the city required the property owner to sign the appli-
cation. (R. 187, 196-197). Harris prepared Exhibit 5, the 
notice of zoning appeal, and he asked Doxey to sign it. Zions 
Securities did not ask Harris or his partner to do anything. 
Exhibit 6 is the copy of the decision on zoning appeal 
dated November 4, 1963. It includes a copy of the minutes 
of the hearing. Those minutes recite that "Mr. Jorgensen ex-
plained that the appeal is in the name of Zions Securities 
Corporation because they are the owners of the property, 
but it has been leased to Artcol Corporation, who are build-
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ing the building." Exhibit 7 includes minutes of a hearing 
and a decision January 25, 1965, for a six months' extension 
after the variance had expired because construction had not· 
started within six months as required. 
Exhibit 8 is a copy of the decision on appeal dated Sep-
tember 7, 196.5. The minutes included in the exhibit recite 
that "Mr. M. E. Harris, Jr., architect, and Weston S. Taylor, 
representing Artcol Corporation, were present. Mr. Taylor 
presented a letter of authorization from C. E. LaBree, Presi-
dent of Artcol Corporation, who are building the structure." 
No one was present from Zions Securities according to the 
minutes. The request for variance for balconies on "A" Street 
was denied, but the other variance requested was granted. 
(R. 189, 197-198). Obviously, the need for variance was 
failure of the architects to prepare plans for Artcol Corpora-
tion which conformed with the zoning regulations. 
The finding of " ( d) Approval of said architectural ser-
vices (Exhibit 22) ," contradicts the express language of Ex-
hibit 22 which was a letter from Zions Securities to the 
Board of Adjustment, January .5, 1965: 
"We were granted a variance order No. 4798 to erect 
an apartment house on the Northeast corner of East 
South Temple and A Streets. Since that time, the devel-
opers to whom we have leased the property, have been 
working through their architect, Mr. M. E. Harris, to 
complete the plans and also to work out the building and 
development program. 
"\Ve are :informed that arrangements are now sub-
stantially completed to undertake this construction, and 
we respectfully request that you grant an extension of 
this variance order." 
Zions Securities neither approved nor disapproved the 
"architectural services" by Exhibit 22. It simply made it clear 
to the Board of Adjustment that Artcol Corporation was the 
lessee of the properly, ancl was the party undertaking con-
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struction, and that M. E. Harris, Jr. was architect for Artcol 
Corporation. 
Zions Securities, the Landlord, never asked Harris to do 
anything. Harris asked Zions Securities to sign applications 
for variance which he had prepared to avoid rejection of the 
architect's plans by the Zoning Commission. Those docu-
ments were signed at the instance and request of Harris, to 
accommodate him and Artcol Corporation. He admitted that 
he had no contract with Zions Securities. ( R. 199). The Ex-
hibits referred to in finding No. 10 cannot be tortured into 
an "implied contract" to pay for the architects' services to 
Artcol, nor to impose on Zions Securities some theoretical or 
fictitious indebtedness in any amount. 
POINT II. 
THE ARCHITECTS CONTRACTED SOLELY 
WITH THE TENANT, AND NO SERVICES WERE 
PERFORMED AT THE "INSTANCE AND RE-
QUEST" OF THE LANDLORD TO CREATE ANY 
INDEBTEDNESS AGAINST THE LANDLORD OR 
TO SUBJECT ITS LAND TO A LIEN. 
Finding of Fact No. 2 correctly recites that "third party 
plaintiff and Harold A. Carlson, as joint venturers, on or 
about the 6th day of August, 1963, contracted to perform 
architectural services with one Artcol Corporation, which 
was the lessee of the real property herein involved 0 0 0 ." 
( R. 132). Such correct finding is inconsistent with the rep-
resentation contained in the "Notice of Lien," Exhibit 19, 
which infers that the contract was made with Harris alone 
and that he did all of the architectural work including super-
vision of construction, although it was stipulated that no 
building was ever built and that the land is vacant. ( R. 221). 
Exhibit 2, designated "A STANDARD FORM OF 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN OWNER AND ARCHITECT," 
22 
dated August 6, 1963, was executed by Artcol Corporation as 
"Owner," and by M. E. Harris, Jr., and Harold A. Carlson as 
"Architect." Zions Securities Corporation was not a party to· 
that agreement, and was not even mentioned therein. Such 
contract provided for a total fee of $212,350.00 to be paid by 
Artcol for all architectural and engineering services, includ-
ing supervision of construction. The contract made those 
fees payable by Artcol upon conditions precedent which 
never occurred: 
"Seventy-five percent ( 75%) of the fee shall be paid 
to the Architect when plans have been approved by 
F. H. A. and loan recorded for construction. The remain-
ing twenty-five percent (25%) balance shall be paid pro-
portionately with each contractors draw during the con-
struction phase." (Emphasis added). 
Since it was "stipulated that no building was constructed 
on the premises" ( R 127, 173), and that the land is "pre-
sently vacant" ( R. 221), the "construction phase" never oc-
curred. It also was stipulated that "no loan ever was recorded 
for construction." (R. 177). The contract, Exhibit 2, made 
no provision for payment of any part of the fees by Artcol 
to the architects except when two things occurred: (a) 
"plans have been approved by F. H. A." and ( b) "loan re-
corded for constrnction." The provisions were not in the dis-
junctive, but conjunctive. Both had to occur. Inasmuch as 
it was stipulated that there never was any loan recorded for 
construction to fulfil condition ( b), testimony as to condition 
(a) was immaterial. 
Such immaterial testimony was to the effect that on 
August 18, 1964, Artcol Corporation filed application for an 
F. H. A. commitment for au insured mortgage for $3,506,000 
(R. 17 4-177); that such commitment was issued on June 23, 
196.5, to Zions First National Bank, the intended mortgagee; 
that the commitment cxpire<l after four sh01t extension; and 
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that on April 22, 1966, the local F. H. A. office received a 
memo from Washington stating that the "commitment in 
this case which expired on April 17, 1966, may not be re-
opened." (R. 175). Inferentially, the mortgage loan out of 
which Harris and Carlson were to be paid 75% of their fees 
by Artcol, never was consummated. Harris explained that 
the project was "abandoned" by Artcol in the fall of 1965 
after the death of Mr. Murphy - an officer of Artcol Corpor-
ation who had been the "driving force." ( R. 204). 
Third party plaintiff M. E. Harris, Jr., on October 4, 
1966, obtained summary judgment against Artcol Corpora-
tion, one of third party defendants, for the sum of 
$212,350.00, being the full amount of all architectural fees 
provided for in Exhibit 2, including supervision of construc-
tion of a building which never was built. By such summary 
judgment the court ordered foreclosure of all right, title and 
interest of Artcol Corporation in the land. ( R. 66-68). 
Whether such judgment against Artcol was predicated on 
some theory of breach of the contract, Exhibit 2, or wrong-
ful abandonment, or on some other theory, such judgment 
does not bind Zions Securities for it was not a party to such 
judgment. No claim was ever made by third party plaintiff 
to the effect that Zions Securities interfered with or wrong-
fully prevented consummation and recordation of a loan for 
construction. 
In his unverified "Notice of Lien," Exhibit 19, Harris de-
clared that "The labor and services were furnished to the 
owners and to the premises above set forth pursuant to a 
contract with Artcol Corporation." Harris made no claim 
then that he had any agreement with Zions Securities. At the 
trial Harris admitted he never made any contract with Zions 
Securities. (R. 199) 
The architects knew they had no contract with Zions 
Securities, express or implied. They did not furnish Zions 
Securities even any copies of the plans and specifications, 
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and they thereby manifested that they did not acknowledge 
any duties or obligations to Zions Securities, the Landlord. 
In Murray v. Zemon, 402 Pa. 354, 167 A. 2d 253, the land-
lord did not sign the contract for repair of the leased build-
ing. Only the tenant signed. The language of the court in 
that case is applicable to the instant case: 
" "' "' "' By its express terms it was manifested that the 
person agreeing to pay the bill was Zemon. No contrac-
tual relationship ever existed between the contractor and 
the owners whereby the latter agreed to pay the cost of 
repairs or any portion thereof. 
" "' "' "' The right to the lien arises not from the act 
of furnishing labor and materials, but rather from the 
debt arising therefrom. Horn & Brannen Mfg. Co. v. Steel-
man, 1906, 215 Pa. 187, 64 A. 409. The right to file a 
mechanics' lien must have a contract as its basis." 
The architects never had any contract with Zions Secur-
ities, express or implied, and Zions Securities never became 
indebted to them or either of them. As aptly stated in Horn 
& Brannen Mfg. Co. v. Steelman, 215 Pa. 187, 64 A. 409: 
"The claims of workmen and materialmen do not be-
come liens on a house from the mere fact that the work 
was done or the materials furnished for its erection, for 
they must be founded on a contract, express or implied, 
direct or indirect, with the owner of the estate sought to 
be charged." 
POINT III. 
SINCE NO BUILDING \VAS EVER CON-
STRUCTED, NO i\IECHANIC'S LIEN COULD 
HAVE ATTACHED TO THE FEE TITLE OF THE 
LANDLORD. 
Sec. 38-J-4, l 1 • <:.A. rn:->:3, specifies: 
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"The liens granted by this chapter shall extend to 
and cover much of the land whereon such building, 
structure or improvement shall be made, as may be neces-
sary for the convenient use and occupation thereof 
0 0 0 
." (Emphasis added). ' 
In the pre-trial order dictated December 12, 1968, it 
was specified: 
"It is stipulated that no building was constructed 
on the premises as a result of the Third Party Plaintiffs 
architectural services. 0 0 0 ." ( R. 127, 173). 
During the trial it was stipulated that "There has been 
no building on this property," and that "The lot is presently 
vacant." ( R. 221). Consequently, no building nor other struc-
ture was constructed upon Zions Securities land to which a 
lienright could possibly attach. 
This Honorable Court has held repeatedly that the pur-
pose of the lien statutes is to prevent the land owner from 
being unjustly enriched from placing improvements upon 
the land which enhance the value of the land by such im-
provements. As explained in King Bros., Inc. v. Utah Dry 
Kiln Co., 13 Utah 2d 339, 374 P. 2d 254: 
"The mechanics lien statutes were designed to pre-
vent the land owner from taking the benefit of improve-
ments placed on his property without paying for the labor 
and materials that went into it. 0 0 0 ." 
" 
0 0 0 In order to qualify under these statutes it is 
necessary that there be an annexation to the land, or to 
some permanent structure upon it, so that the materials 
in question can properly be regarded as having become a 
party of the realty, or a fixture appurtenant to it; and 
this must have been done with the intention of making 
h f 000" it a permanent part t ereo . . 
To the same effect is Frehner v. Morton, et al., 18 
Utah 2d 422, 424 P. 2d 446 at 447, citing Stanton Transpor-
tation Co. v. Davis, 9 Utah 2d 184, 341 P. 2d 207. 
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No improvement was made to the land to which a lien 
could attach, and nothing by way of improvement was done 
to enhance the value of the land. In fact, the rent-producing 
building which was on the land at the time the ground lease 
was executed June 26, 1963, Exhibit 21, was destroyed, and 
no other building was erected in its place. ( R. 193). Instead 
of the property being enhanced in value it was disimproved 
and depreciated in value. 
Under statutes similar to the Utah statute 38-1-4, U. C. A. 
1953, where no building has been erected, it has been held 
that no lien can attach to the land for architectural services. 
The reasons is, for a lien to attach it must attach to the build-
ing or improvement and to "so much of the land whereon 
such building, strncture or improvement shall be made, as 
may be necessary for the convenient use and occupation 
thereof." As explained in Lipscomb v. Exchange National 
Bank, 80 Wash. 296, 141P.686 at 687: 
" 
0 0 0 It is not the rule that an architect who pre-
pares plans and specifications for a building which is not 
erected may claim a lien for such services upon the land 
on which it was contemplated erecting the building. The 
law contemplates that the lien is to attach to the building 
and upon so much of the land as may be necessary for its 
use and occupation. In other words, the lien attaches to 
the property which the service has aided in producing. 
\Vhere, therefore, the building contemplated has not 
been erected, no lien for the architest's services in draw-
ing plans can attach to specific property. 0 0 0 ." 
In Foster v. Tierney, 91 lowa 253, 59 N. W. 56, the court 
said: 
" 
0 0 0 It is then a question whether or not an archi-
tect who prepares plans and specifications for a building 
that is not erected, or an improvement that is not made, 
has a lien therefor. Take the case of a building for which 
such pla11s arc made, and it is not erected, and there is 
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nothing to which the lien can attach but the naked land. 
Can it be said that work has been done upon the build-
ing? The law contemplates that the lien is to attach to 
the building and the land upon which it is situated. 0 0 0 ." 
In the instant case Zions Securities did not enter into any 
contract with any one to have plans and specifications pre-
pared. However, in Clark v. Smith, 234 Wis. 138, 290 N. W. 
592, 127 A. L. R. 406, the landowner actually contracted 
with the architect to prepare plans and specifications; but 
the plans were not used. The court held that under the facts 
shown the owner was legally liable to the architect for such 
services as contracted, but the court denied the validity of 
the notice of lien: 
"As to the lien filed by defendants, no construction of 
the house having been begun, no lien could attach." 
The text statement in 60 A. L. R. 1270 is: 
"The greater number of the decisions dealing with 
the right of an architect to a lien for plans drawn are to 
the effect that there can be no lien for the services ren-
dered by an architect in drawing plans and specifications 
which were never used in the construction of an intended 
building or other structure." (Citing cases). 
Finding of fact No. 7 states that "the first work by third 
party plaintiff with respect o said plans and specifications 
was furnished on the 13th of April 1963," etc. ( R. 133). It 
does not state, of course, that Zions Securities was furnished 
anything by either of the architects. Finding of fact No. 8 
infers, contrary to the facts, that the architects' plans and 
specifications were put into execution on the land and that 
construction in accordance with plans and specifications was 
"commenced": 
"8. That work on the land was commenced by the 
clearing of the ground and digging of soil test holes, but 
no further construction was undertaken, and the project 
later was abandoned." 
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Said finding contradicts the stipulation "that no build-
ing was constructed on the premises as a result of the third 
party plaintiff's architectural service" (R. 127, 173). No con-
tract was ever awarded for construction of a new building to 
execute the plans and specifications. There was no proof of 
"clearing of the land," but what was done on the land could 
not constitute "commencement of construction" of the de-
signed building, as either of the activities performed could 
occur wihout ever building a new building or making any 
improvement upon the land. 
The testimony was that Artcol Corporation, the Tenant, 
paid a third party for demolition of an old building which 
had a rental value of $100 per month. Harris made no claim 
that he or his partner did the work or paid for it. He testified 
that he suggested to Artcol Corporation the names of spe-
c.:ialty contractors, and that Artcol paid for the demolition. 
( R. 200-201, 221). Destruction of the income-producing 
building certainly was not an "improvement to the land," but 
a dis-improvement. Harris testified that Exhibit 13 is a report 
of soil analysis. ( R. 191-192). He said he requested soil tests, 
but that Artcol Corporation paid for that work. ( R. 200) 
Exhibit 13 is a "Foundation Investigation for Artcol Corpor-
ation Apartment Building," prepared by the engineering 
firm of Furhiman, Rollins and Co., dated March 3, 1964. 
Artcol Corporation was designated therein as the "Client." 
The report was addressed to W. K. Murphy of Artcol Cor-
poration. Exhibit 13 clearly shows that the soil tests were 
made under an indepentdent contract between the Tenant, 
Artcol Corporation, and a third-party firm of engineers. Such 
contract for engineering services was not a part of the con-
tract for architectural services, Exhibit 2. 
Sec. 38-1-3, U.C.A. 1953, does not make lienable either 
soil tests or demolition of a building. In Sound Transfer Co. 
v. Phinney Realty & lnrcst. Co., 71 Wash. 473,128 P. 1047, it 
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was held that wrecking a building is not lienable under the 
general lien statute which permits liens for "alteration, con-
struction or repair of any building." In a later case, Bon 
"Afarche Realty Co. v. Southern Surety Co., 152 Wash. 604, 
278 P. 679, 63 A. L. R. 1246, the court again held that de-
molition of an existing building "is not lienable" under the 
general lien statute relating to alteration, construction or re-
pair of any building, etc. The court also held that demolition 
of a building is not even lienable under the Washington sta-
tute which grants a lien to a person who by authority of the 
owner "clears, grades, fills in or otherwise improves" land. 
The court said: 
"The contractor was not 'clearing, grading or filling 
in' the property, as these acts can only be performed on 
land not actually occupied by buildings. 0 0 0 ." 
Suppose Utah had a statute which granted a lien for soil 
tests and also for demolition of a building. The lien could 
only be granted as security for the unpaid debt. Harris him-
self admitted that both the soils engineers and the demoli-
tion contractor had been paid by Artcol, so they could not 
have had a lien. However, by finding of fact No. 8 and by 
conclusion of law No. 1 the trial court attempted to give 
Harris a lien for the work performed by independent third 
parties who were paid in full by Artcol, the Tenant, and 
which had no relationship to or connection with the plans 
and specifications. Conclusion of law No. 1 contradicts the 
stipulations and the undisputed evidence, and is contrary to 
law: 
"I. That the interest in the real property of the third 
party defendant Zions Securities Corporation, became 
lienable under the provisions of 38-1-3, Utah Code An-
natated, 1953, by reason of its conduct during the times 
architectural services were performed, and work having 
been commenced within the meaning of the statute by 
the clearing of the ground and the digging of soil test 
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holes, the lien attached and was not defeated by later 
abandonment of the work." 
Sec. 38-1-5, U. C. A. 1953, referred to by conclusion 
of law No. 1 does not authorize the court to grant liens 
against a party not liable, nor for contemplated improve-
ments of a lessee never made. That statute was designed to 
establish priority with respect to actual improvements made 
to the land: 
"The liens herein provided for shall relate back to, 
and take effect as of, the time of the commencement to 
do work or furnish materials on the ground for the struc-
ture or improvement and shall have priority over any 
lien, mortgage or other encumbrance which may have 
attached subsequently to the time when the building, 
improvement or structure was commenced, work begun, 
or first material furnished on the ground; 0 0 0 ." 
In construing such statute this Honorable Court stated 
in Western Mortgage Loan Corp. v. Cottonwood Construc-
tion Co., 18 Utah 2d 409, 424 P. 2d 437: 
" 
0 0 0 \tVe are inclined to the view that the legisla-
ture intended the language 'commencement to do work 
or furnish materials on the ground' to be limited to re-
late to the home or other structure which was being or 
about to be built upon the land. To tack the liens for 
labor or materials that went into the house to the liens 
that may have arisen for labor and materials furnished 
in off-site improvements in connection with the laying 
out and construction of facilities used in connection with 
the subdivision as a whole would be going beyond the 
intent of the statute. 0 0 0 " 
Under a similar statute, "commencement of construc-
tion" has been defined to mean actual operations on the 
ground for erection of a building, done with the intention to 
continue the work until the building is completed. Security 
Stove & Mfg. Co. v. Sellards, 133 Kan. 747, 3 P. 2d 481 at 
482, 76 A. L. R. l.'397. 
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Unlike the present case, in Headlund v. Daniels, 50 Utah 
381, 167 P. 1170, it was the fee owner who employed the 
architect and agreed to pay his fee. The architect not only 
furnished the fee owner who employed him plans and speci-
fications, but also supervision in the remodeling of a theater 
building. After paying part of the fee the owner declined to 
pay the balance. In defending a suit for foreclosure of arch-
itect's lien, the fee owner claimed that the actual costs of 
remodeling greatly exceeded the maximum cost represented 
by the architect through the negligence of the architect. 
In contrast, the land of Zions Securities never was im-
proved as a result of the alleged architectural services of 
Harris and Carlson who were employed solely by the Tenant 
under written contract, Exhibit 2, in which the Tenant was 
designated as "Owner." Zions Securities received no more 
benefit from the plans and specifications prepared for the 
Tenant than if those documents had been sent to some 
stranger in Hong Kong. No mortgage loan was ever con-
summated by the Tenant, and no contract for construction 
was ever awarded. No building was ever built to which a 
lienright could attach; but if a building had been built in 
accordance with the architects' plans and specification, the 
lien could have attached only against the leasehold interests 
of the Tenant, Artcol Corporation. 
The entire judgment is unsupported by the evidence 
and is contrary to law. 
POINT IV 
NO INDEBTEDNESS AROSE UNDER ANY 
THEORY OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT. 
A mechanic's lien must be predicted upon an unpaid 
debt for materials or services furnished which result in and 
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produce an improvement to the land. In Metropolitan Water 
Co. v. Hikl, (Old.), 415 P. 2d 970, the court said: 
"A mechanic's lien secures the payment of a debt and 
if there is no debt created by the contract to which the 
lien can attach there can be no lien. The rule is ex-
pressed in Phillips, Mechanics' Liens, Section 112 ( 2d 
ed. ) as follows: 
"'The creation of the lien, though arising by virtue of 
express legislative enactment, is essentially dependent 
upon the existence of contract, express or implied, and 
the obligation of debt arising out of its stipulations by 
the mechanic. 0 0 0 As the lien security is an incident 
that follows the legal liability to pay, whenever that ob-
ligation does not arise, or ceases, this security does not 
exist. 0 0 0 ' " 
Any indebtedness of the landlord to give rise to a lien 
would have had to be created either: 
(1) By express contract; 
( 2) By implied contract-that is, a contract implied in 
fact by the landlord's acts; or 
( 3) By a quasi-contract: One implied at law resulting 
from unjust enrichment. 
We have shown under points I and II that there was no 
express contract nor contract implied in fact between either 
or both of the architects and the landlord, Zions. Further-
more, we have also already noted that the architect's attorney 
stipulated at the pretrial that the architect was not proceed-
ing under the theory of an implied contract ( R. 127, 172.) 
It is our contention that there could be no contract implied 
at law because there was no enrichment of the Landlord, 
unjustly or otherwise. No evidence was offered to show that 
the Landlord received anything from the architect. It did 
not even receive the plans. 
By finding of fact No. 5 the trial court attempted to give 
the architects credit for services perfonned for Artcol Cor-
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poration by third parties, Exhibits 13 to 16, ( R. 132). There 
was no proof of "site preparation." Such finding contradicts 
the testimony of Harris himself, that the soil tests, surveys 
and topographic studies were performed by third parties, 
and the work was paid for by Artcol. (R. 191-193, 200). No 
indebtedness could have existed, and since those services of 
third parties were paid for in full, there could be no lien 
arising as security for a service paid for in full. 
Finding of fact No. 11 about Artcol paying rent and 
taxes, is immaterial and irrelevant, as well as partially un-
supported by the evidence since there was no proof that 
Artcol paid any taxes. ( R. 133). However, the payment by 
Artcol of the ground rentals required to be paid under the 
terms of the Ground Lease, Exhibit 21, could not possibly 
create any implied promise on the part of Zions Securities 
to pay for any services of the architects hired by Artcol. 
There was no express finding that Zions Securities be-
came indebted to the architects or to either of them; but by 
conclusion of law No. 6 and by the "Foreclosure Decree and 
Judgment" appealed from, without any competent evidence 
and contrary to law the trial court prejudicially adjudged 
Zions Securities Corporation to be "indebted" to Harris (one 
of the architects) in the sum of $210,114.90, and that Harris 
had a valid lien to secure that "debt," foreclosed Zions Se-
curities of title to its lands, and ordered a sale of the "mort-
gaged property" to satisfy said "indebtedness" (which never 
came in to existence ) . ( R. 135, 136, 138-139). 
The court's adjudication was error. 
POINT V 
THE ASSIGNMENT FROM CARLSON TO 
HARRIS, NOT HA YING BEEN EXECUTED AND 
DELIVERED UNTIL TWO YEARS AFTER A 
LIENRIGHT ON A PARTNERSHIP CLAIM 
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\-VOULD HA VE EXPIRED, COULD NOT RETRO-
ACTIVELY TRANSFORM A FATALLY DEFEC-
TIVE "NOTICE OF LIEN" FOR A NON-EXIST-
ING INDIVIDUAL CLAIM INTO A VALID LIEN 
ON A PARTNERSHIP CLAIM. 
Two of the issues stated at the pre-trial were: 
"(2) Can the third party plaintiff Harris assert a lien 
in this action under his own name only on the facts of 
this case? 
" ( 3) Does the fact that the claim of lien arose under 
a joint venture between Harris and Carlson, and that the 
notice of claim of lien was filed in Harris' name only 
void the notice of claim of lien?" ( R. 126, 172). 
M. E. Harris, Jr. knew that the only contract for arch-
itectural services was Exhibit 2, which was between Artcol 
Corporation as "Owner" and Harris and Carlson as "Arch-
itect," admitedly partners or joint venturers. Any cause of 
action arising on such contract would have been a cause of 
action owned hy the two architects as partners or as joint 
venturers, not any individual right of action for Harris alone. 
A partnership cause of action is entirely different. Under 
the Uniform Partnership Act, Sec. 48-1-22, U. C. A. 1953, 
the rights of partners in property are joint: "A partner is 
co-owner with his partners of specific partnership property 
holding as tenants in partnership." 
In Bates v. Simpson, 121 Utah 165, 239 P. 2d 749, this 
Court said: 
"We have frequently announced in this court that 
joint adventure is in the nature of a partnership', vVa-
satch Livestock Loan Co. v. Lewis & Sharp, 84 Utah 347, 
35 P. 2d 835." 
To the same effect are Forbes v. Butler, 66 Utah 373, 
242 P. 950, and Lane v. Peterson, 68 Utah 585, 251 P. 374. 
35 
See also 30 Am. ]ur., Joint Adventures, Sec. 4. In 40 Am. 
]ur., Partnership, Sec. 432, the rule is stated: 
"Since partnership obligations in contracts are joint, 
and not joint and several, it is necessary, under common 
law practice, and in most jurisdictions, under modern 
practice provisions, that all partners join as parties 
plaintiff in an action on a partnership obligation." 
The rights of Harris and Carlson for architectural serv-
ices under their contract with Artcol Corporation, Exhibit 
2, dated August 6, 1963, were partnership or joint venture 
rights. Inasmuch as the designing was done as a partner-
ship, if any lienright arose against someone for architectural 
services such lienright would have been a joint right of both 
Harris and Carlson, and not an individual right of Harris 
alone, for at the time Exhibit 19 was filed by Harris for 
himself without even recognizing the existence of his part-
ner Harris, there was no assignment from Carlson to Harris. 
No notice of lien was ever filed by or in the name of the 
partnership either within the time limited by law or even 
after the time expired. 
Independent of the invalidity of Exhibit 19 for lack of 
verification, discussed under Point VI, said "Notice of Lien" 
was based on a non-existing individual claim of Harris alone 
which at least inferentially denied that any architectural 
services had been performed by any one except Harris, and 
negatived the theory of any partnership or joint venture 
claim. Said Exhibit 19 so misrepresented the facts that 
Harris likely would not have been willing to risk swearing 
to the truth of such a claim: 
(1) Harris represented that the architectural services 
were performed "pursuant to a contract with Artcol Cor-
poration". He refrained from mentioning that the contract 
between Artcol Corporation as "Owner" was not with Harris 
alone, but with Harris and Carlson, as "Architect." ( 2) 
Harris falsely represented that he (not he and Carlson) had 
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"bestowed" services in "the sum of $212,350.00" pursuant to 
said contract with Artcol, when he knew that Carlson had 
performed a substantial part of the services ( R. 198), and 
that under Exhibit 2 the full contract fee included super-
vision of construction which never occurred. ( 3) Harris 
falsely represented that "All credits and offsets have been 
deducted from the amounts remaining owing'', when he 
knew that 25% of the fee was for supervision which was not 
performed because no building was ever constructed. ( 4) 
Harris represented that by the contract with Artcol Cor-
poration "it agreed to pay for same seventy-five percent 
upon the completion and acceptance of the working draw-
ings and specifications'', when he knew that Exhibit 2 ex-
pressly stated: "Seventy-five percent (75%) of the fee shall 
be paid to the Architect when plans have been approved by 
F. H. A. and loan recorded for construction." By the express 
declarations of the contract the first money was not payable 
by Artcol until there was a "loan recorded for construction." 
It was stipulated that "no loan was ever recorded for con-
struction." (R. 177). ( 5) Harris also falsely represented that 
his services had been "bestowed" upon "the property" and 
"furnished" to "the premises'', and inferentially that the land 
had been improved by executing the plans and specifica-
tions into a new building. Harris well knew that no building 
ever was constructed to put the plans into operation on the 
land. Harris knew that the land was not "improved'', but 
dis-improved by the demolition of some rental property. 
( R. 200-201, 221). 
Among the prejudicial errors in conclusion of law No. 4 
the trial court declared that "the lien attached upon com-
mencement of work", although it was undisputed and even 
stipulated that the plans and specifications were not used 
in the construction of a building. The court further contra-
dicted the language of Exhibit 19 and the evidence and 
stipulations by declaring that "there was no dispute that 
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any of the allegations within the notice were other than as 
found by the court at the trial, and the notice of lien is 
therefore valid." (R. 135). We see nothing in the findings of 
fact which show that the court pronounced the false repre-
sentations of Harris in Exhibit 19 to be truthful but in the 
' light of the stipulations and admissions made at the pre-trial 
and trial, any such findings, if they had been made would 
simply be further prejudicial error. 
Third party plaintiff utterly failed to prove that he had 
a valid lien. Conclusion of law No. 5, therefore, was prejudi-
cial error. Independent of failure to verify on oath, Harris' 
"Notice of Lien" was not only invalid and unprovable be-
cause it was predicted on a non-existing individual claim, 
but it was unenforceable because of serious misstatements 
of fact which were unverifiable on oath. It has been held 
that any wilful misstatement of material facts in a lien claim, 
such as an excessive monetary claim, will defeat foreclosure, 
for a lien claimant is required to state the true facts under 
oath. Friedman v. Stein, 71A.2d 346. 
No partnership lien claim was ever filed at any time. 
However, if a partnership lien claim had been filed, since 
there was no pretense of any assignment from one partner 
to the other during the period of limitations for filing lien 
foreclosure action, both partners would have been necessary 
parties. In Ruzicka v. Rager, 305 N. Y. 191, 111 N. E. 2d 878, 
39 A. L. R. 2d 288, it was held that "a member of a partner-
ship may not recover upon a partnership obligation individ-
ually." The court declared that partners sue in a different 
capacity from their capacities as individuals. The rule is that 
one partner may not maintain an action on a partnership 
claim without a prior assignment of all rights of the other 
partners: 
Purcel et al. v. Cecil G. Wells, et al., 236 F. 2d 469. 
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Grant County Deposit Bank v. McCampbell, 194 F. 2d 
469. 
Hfldebrand et al. v. Stonecrest Corp., (Cal. App.) 344 P. 
2d 378 at 386. 
Peck et al. v. Better Business Standards, 44 Wash. 2d 
604, 271 p. 2d 697. 
Seltzer v. Chadwick, 26 Wash. 2d 297, 173 P. 2d 991. 
Karp v. Coolview of Wisconsin, Inc., 25 Wis. 2d 299, 130 
N. W. 2d 790. 
By its answer Zions Securities took the position that it 
had no contract with either of the architects, and that the 
only contract the architects ever entered into was with Art-
col Corporation, the Tenant. By the Ninth Defense, Zions 
Securities alleged that by the terms of Exhibit 2 all compen-
sation was payable jointly by Artcol to Harold A. Carlson 
and M. E. Harris, Jr. upon fulfillment of the terms and con-
ditions of said contract; that Carlson never assigned nor re-
linquished his interest under said contract, and that "Harold 
A. Carlson is an indispensible party to this action" as a part-
ner of Harris and by reason of having performed a substan-
tial part of the architectural services allegedly performed 
under said contract with Artcol Corporation. ( R. 41-42). 
Apparently in an effort to avoid said Ninth Defense, if 
possible, Harris obtained from Harold A. Carlson an assign-
ment dated July 1, 1968, Exhibit 1. Harris then filed his sup-
plemental third party complaint July 10, 1968, to which was 
attached a photo copy of Exhibit 1 ( R. 104-106). Said sup-
plemental third party complaint did not change the action 
from an attempted foreclosure on a void non-existing indi-
vidual claim into a foreclosure of a partnership lien claim 
for no partnership lien claim was ever filed, and the time for 
commencement of foreclosure of a partnership lien claim, if 
one had been filed, would have expired under the one year 
limitation of Sec. 38-1-11, U. C. A. 1953. Furthermore, there 
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was no allegation that Zions Securities was a party to Ex-
hibit 2, which was the contract between Artcol Corporation 
as "Owner" and Harris and Carlson as "Architect." An exam-
ination of Exhibit 2 clearly shows that Zions Securities was 
not a party. 
Said assignment was not even executed until July 1, 1968, 
or more than two years after the foreclosure proceeding was 
commenced on Exhibit 19. Contrary to law and the undis-
puted evidence the court prejudicially entered as a conclu-
sion of law that 
"2. The notice of lien was valid though only claimed 
by third party plaintiff in view of the assignment from 
Harold A. Carlson to third party plaintiff." ( R. 135). 
The trial court disregarded the fact that no assignment 
had been made at the time Exhibit 19 was executed as an 
individual lien claim in November 1965, nor at any time 
prior to commencement of foreclosure. Harris' unverified 
"Notice of Lien" filed November 22, 1965, was based on a 
non-existing individual claim. Notwithstanding its invalidity 
the trial court attempted to validate it by an assignment ex-
ecuted July 1, 1968-nearly 21 months after Harris recovered 
summary judgment against Artcol Corporation on Exhibit 
19. Carlson did not attempt to make his assignment retro-
active, but by conclusion of law No. 2 the trial court treated 
said assignment as if it had been executed and delivered in 
November 1963 prior to the filing of Harris' "Notice of 
Lien." In effect, by implication the court amended Exhibit 1 
without authority of law to infer that it became effective 31 
months before it was executed and delivered. An assignment 
can become operative to transfer some existing right only as 
of date of delivery, certainly never prior to date of execu-
tion. Such belated assignment could not retoactively change 
Exhibit 19 from an invalid individual claim of Harris into a 
valid partnership lienright, particularly when no partnership 
lien claim was ever filed. By said Exhibit 1 it is declared: 
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" 
0 0 0 Harold A. Carlson, does hereby assign, trans-
fer and set over unto M. E. Harris, Jr. all right, title and 
interest in and to that certain conh·act by and between 
the parties hereto and Artcol Corporation dated August 
6, 1963, with respect to architectural services for a pro-
posed aparhnent commercial building 0 0 0 • The under-
signed does further assign to M. E. Harris, Jr. all right, 
title and interest to any and all claims by M. E. Harris, 
Jr. and the undersigned as architects against Zions Se-
curities Corporation, including all right, title and interest 
in and to all claims and demands by reason of that cer-
tain mechanic's lien dated November 16, 1965, and filed 
in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder Novem-
ber 22, 1965, 0 0 0 ." 
At the trial it was disclosed that Exhibit 1, the assign-
ment from Carlson to Harris, dated July 1, 1968, was pro-
cured "with the help of Mr. LaBrae of Artcol Corporation." 
( R. 199). Further inquiry indicated that notwithstanding 
execution of Exhibit 1 long after commencement of fore-
closure on Exhibit 19, Carlson as a partner of Harris would 
claim an interest in any proceeds of the litigation. Counsel 
for Harris said, "As to Mr. Carlson, we will stipulate that he 
may claim an interest in the proceeds; that the partnership 
has never been wound up, though long ago dissolved." ( R. 
200). 
Carlson did not appear at the trial. The assignment from 
Carlson could not change the foreclosure action from one 
based on a void individual claim of Harris alone, into a fore-
closure on a partnership lien claim which never was filed. 
Whatever might have been the transaction entered into be-
tween Harris and Carlson to have Carlson execute the as-
signment July 1, 1968, the assignment could not amend the 
fatally defective non-partnership "Notice of Lien" filed by 
Harris. There was no valid lien filed which could be fore-
closed against Zions Securities. The judgment against Zions 
Securities was prejudicial error in its entirety. 
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POINT VI 
THE "NOTICE OF LIEN" WAS VOID ON ITS 
FACE, FOR IT NEVER WAS VERIFIED TO COM-
PLY WITH THE STATUTE. 
(A) The decree adjudging Exhibit 19 to be a valid lien 
against the title of the landlord is contrary to law. 
At the pre-trial counsel for Zions Securities objected to 
the introduction in evidence of Exhibit 19, the "Notice of 
Lien'', because it was void on its face. It never was verified 
on the oath of either the lien claimant or of some other per-
son, to satisfy one of the indispensible requirements of the 
lien statutes. Independent of all other prejudicial errors 
which precluded entry of any valid judgment that the Land-
lord was indebted to the architects or to either of them in 
any sum or amount, there was no valid lien which lawfully 
could be foreclosed. The decree of foreclosure based on a 
non-existing indebtedness amounted to confiscation of the 
dis-improved land, and in effect amounted to the making of 
a gift of $210,114.90 to one of the architects who had done 
exactly nothing for the Landlord, and who admitted that he 
never made any contract with the Landlord. 
Mechanics' liens are creatures of statute. Sec. 38-1-7, 
U. C. A. 1953, expressly imposes on every lien claimant an 
indispensible requirement that the 
"claim must be verified by the oath of himself or of 
some other person." 
M. E. Harris, Jr., third party plaintiff, merely acknowl-
edged his signature. He did not verify the lien claim on oath 
as required by Sec. 38-1-7. Nor was Exhibit 19 verified by 
the oath of any other person. It is elementary that a mere 
acknowledgment does not constitute an oath. 
The pre-trial order dictated December 12, 1968, stated 
one of the issues to be: 
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" ( 4) Is the notice of claim of lien void by reason of 
its not being verified?" (R. 126, 172). 
We have found no prior Utah case involving an unveri-
fied claim of lien. Decisions of the highest courts of some 
other states having statutes similar to the Utah statute, hold 
that a claim of lien which is merely acknowledged, but not 
verified, is null and void and unenforceable. 
In D. /. Fair Lumber Co. v. Karlin, 199 Kan. 366, 430 P. 
2d 222, in holding that a lien claim which was acknowl-
edged, but not verified, was null and void, the court said: 
"
0 0 0 Here the lien statement was not verified at all. 
It was merely acknowledged. It is obvious that an 
acknowledgment does not constitute a verification nor 
even an attempted one. An acknowledgment shows, 
merely prima facie, that an instrument was duly exe-
cutedwhereas a verification is an affidavit attached to a 
statement as to the truth of the matters therein set 
forth. 0 0 0 " 
"In Phillips, Mechanics' Liens (3rd ed.) p. 637 § 366, 
it was said: 
"'Where a statute declares that the notice to create 
a lien 'shall be verified' before filing, it is essential to the 
creation of the lien that it should be sworn to in the man-
ner prescribed. The want of verification, or of a suffi-
cient verification, is a defect which goes to the whole 
claim, and cannot be amended. 0 0 0 • ' " 
"The plaintiff's lien statement, lacking verification, 
created no lien. The acknowledgment added nothing to 
its validity. 0 0 0 " 
"In view of the foregoing, we hold that the acknowl-
ment of plaintiff's mechanic's lien statement was not a 
verification or an attempted verification as required by 
K.S.A. 60-1102 and 60-1103, and since the same was not 
corrected within the statutory period for obtaining a 
valid lien, the lien statement was vitally defective when 
filed and it cannot now be amended to permit its verifi-
catidn. The district court did not err in dismissing the 
plaintiff's action." 
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In Ekstrom United Supply Co. v. Ash Grove Lime & 
P. C. Co., 194 Kan. 634, 400 P. 2d 707 at 709, the court held 
that the attempted verification was fatally defective: 
"The validity of a lien created solely by statute de-
pends upon the terms of the statute, and parties may not 
by estoppel enact or enlarge a statute. 0 0 0 A lien claim-
ant must secure a lien under the statute or not at all. 
0 0 0 The verification prescribed in the statute is one of 
the necessary steps. Without such verification the lien 
claimant obtains nothing." 
In the dissenting opinion, Justice Fontron claimed that 
there was a sufficient verification in that case, and distin-
guished it from an acknowledgment: 
" 
0 0 0 In Reeves v. Kansas Coop. Wheat Mk't. 
Assn., 136 Kan. 306, 15 P. 2d 446, on which the court 
seems chiefly to rely, the statement was not verified at 
all; it was acknowledged. The distinction between a ver-
ification and an acknowledgment is too well recognized 
and understood to require extensive comment. It is 
enough to say that the two are not equivalent; an ac-
knowledgment serves a quite different purpose than does 
a verification." 
In Reeves v. Kansas Coop. Wheat Mk't. Ass'n. 136 Kan. 
306, 309, 15 P. 2d 446, 448, where there was an acknowl-
edgment, but no verification of the lien claim, the court 
said: 
"The verification prescribed in the statute means 
that the statement filed shall be sworn to by the claimant 
before an officer having authority by law to administer 
and certify oaths and affirmations. It was evidently in-
tended to require truth and accuracy in the statement, 
but whatever the purpose may have been, it is an essen-
tial element of a valid lien. Plaintiff offered to show and 
did testify that when the acknowledgment was made he 
was sworn to the statement, but the statement filed to 
constitute a lien must be complete in itself and 
must show on its face all the matters which the statute 
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requires to be shown to create and fix the lien. The 
statute is mandatory and the lack of verification in the 
statement filed, and which is to serve as a notice to the 
public, necessarily defeats the lien. "' "' "'." 
In Home Plumbing and Contracting Co. v. Pruitt, 70 
N. M. 182, 372 P. 2d 378, in holding invalid and unenforce-
able the lien claim for lack of verification, the New Mexico 
Supreme Court said: 
"Our statute ( § 61-2-6, N.M.S.A. 1953) requires that 
a claim of lien 'must be verified by the oath of' the per-
son claiming the benefit of the lien statute 'or of some 
other person: Accordingly, we must determine if the 
two claims here in issue are verified by oath." 
The court pointed out that one lien claim was ver-
ified as required by statute, while the other one merely 
was acknowledged, but not verified: 
"However, as to the Home Plumbing and Contract-
ing Company claim, we fail to find any words whatso-
ever which by intendment, plain, or otherwise, 'were 
designed to operate as a verification.' Neither do we 
find where the statement of claim was in any man-
ner sworn to. 
"In Black's Law Dictionary, 'verification' is defined 
as: 'Confirmation of correctness, truth, or authenticity 
by affidavit, oath or deposition.' See 44 Words and 
Phrases for other definitions. 
"While reiterating our adherence to the rule of 
liberal construction, we are convinced that with a total 
absence of any words confirming correctness, truth or 
authenticity by affidavit, oath, deposition or otherwise, 
to conclude that the acknowledgement to the instant 
claim of lien was a sufficient compliance with the require-
ments of a verification would be stretching the rule of 
liberal construction beyond recognition, and would ap-
proach judicial repeal of the legislative mandate that 
claims should be verified by oath. Compare Ross v. Mar-
berry & Company, 66 N.M. 404, 349 P. 2d 123. Accord-
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ingly, the court erred in its conclusion that the claim of 
lien of Home Plumbing and Contracting Company was 
enforceable." 
As illustrated under Point V, Exhibit 19 filed by Harris 
contained such serious misstatements of fact in attempting 
to assert a claim of lien for Harris alone, that he could not 
be expected to risk swearing to such statements. Since there 
was no individual lienright for Harris alone, and no valid 
partnership lien claim was ever executed, Harris failed to 
establish a valid lien. 
Exhibit 19 not having been verified was not entitled to 
recordation, but even if recordation could conceivably im-
part any constructive notice, it could only be such notice as 
the document itself set forth including the fact that it was 
not verified as required by statute and the further fact that 
Harris made no claim that he had any contract with Zions 
Securities Corporation or that he did any work at the in-
stance and request of Zions Securities. Recordation could 
not remedy any inherent defect. 
Conclusion of law No. 5 "That the lien of third party 
plaintiff is a first and valid lien upon the interest of third 
party defendant" ( R. 135), and the judgment and all por-
tions thereof, constituted prejudicial error. 
( B) The court erred in holding {hat invalidity of the lien 
was waived. 
Inasmuch as the statute requires verification, there 
could not be valid execution of a notice of lien without ver-
ifying under oath. By conclusion of law No. 4 the court 
declared: 
"The fact that the notice of claim of lien was ac-
knowledged but not verified was not raised by the 1?,lead-
ings and was waived by third party defendant, etc. 
(R. 125). 
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The trial court thereby recognized the lack of verifica-
tion. However, "The fact that the notice of claim of lien 
was acknowledged but not verified'', was raised by the 
pleadings. First of all, it was raised by third party plaintiff 
M. E. Harris, Jr. himself, by attaching to his third party 
complaint a photo copy of said "Notice of Lien", marked 
Exhibit "A" and incorporated into such pleading by ref-
erence. (R. 8-13). Harris demonstrated by his own pleading 
that he had failed to comply with an indispensible require-
ment of the lien statute, Sec. 38-1-7, U. C. A. 1953, and that 
for lack of such compliance his "Notice of Lien" was null 
and void and could not be foreclosed. Zions Securities Cor-
poration challenged the sufficiency of such pleading by a 
timely motion to dismiss, which included a defense per· 
mitted under Rule 12(b )(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
to-wit: "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted" against Zions Securities Corporation. ( R. 22-23). 
Such rule does not require a party making such motion to 
furnish his adversary a bill of particulars. 
A reasonable and prudent person reading Sec. 38-1-7 of 
ing the copy of "Notice of Lien" thereto attached and incor-
porated therein by reference, could not escape discovery of 
the obvious failure to comply with the statutory requirement 
to verify a lien claim on oath; that the lien claim was void 
on its face for want of substance; and consequently, that the 
third party complaint failed to state a claim for relief, which 
was incurable, and that said pleading should be dismissed. 
After denial of its motion to dismiss for failure of Harris 
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, Zions 
Securities filed its answer. ( R. 25-43). The First Defense in 
that answer asserts that the third party complaint does not 
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state facts constituting a claim for relief against Zions Securi-
ties Corporation. (R. 25). Rule 12 (i), U. R. C. P. specifies: 
"The filing of a responsive pleading after denial of 
any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be 
deemed a waiver of such motion." 
Rule 8 ( c) on "Affirmative Defenses" does not require a 
defendant to plead as an affirmative defense the failure of a 
complaining party to state a cause of action. Surely, a de-
fendant is not required to plead a defense which is clearly 
set forth in the complainant's own pleading. 
Rule 12 ( h) expressly states that a party does not waive 
"the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted" nor "the defense of failure to join an indispens-
ible party," and that either of such defense may be made by 
"motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the 
merits." 
The allegations of paragraph 6 of third party complaint 
"That said lien is a first and valid lien upon the interest of 
both third party defendants in the premises described there-
in ( R. 10), were expressly denied by paragraph 6 of the an-
swer, (R. 37), so that the validity of the lien was put in issue 
in another way. Zions Securities never has admitted the 
validity of said obviously void notice of lien, Exhibit 19, in 
whole or in part. On the contrary, by paragraph 21 of its 
answer, Zions Securities alleged that 
"Said notice of lien dated November 16, 1965, was 
null and void, and the same was not subject to recorda-
tion under the law." ( R. 40). 
After Harris filed his supplemental third party complaint 
on July 9, 1968 (R. 104-106), Zions Securities filed an 
amended answer to meet the allegations and implications of 
the supplemental third party complaint. By the First Defense, 
Second Defense and Third Defense, the defense of "failure 
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to state a claim upon which relief can be granted" against 
Zions Securities, again was asserted. ( R. 107). 
Exhibit 19 was the unilateral act of M. E. Harris, Jr. Zions 
Securities had nothing to do with the preparation of such 
invalid lien claim. The fatal defect of lack of verification is 
chargeable solely to Hanis. Contrary to the conclusion of 
the trial court, the issue of lack of verification was raised by 
the pleadings (a) by the third party complaint itself, ( b) by 
motion to dismiss, ( c) by the defense stated in the original 
answer, and ( d) by the amended answer. Furthermore, one 
of the issues stated in the pre-trial order was: 
" ( 4) Is the notice of claim of lien void by reason of its 
not being verified?" (R. 126, 172). 
Contrary to the conclusion of the trial court, there was 
no "waiver" by Zions Securities of the failure of lien claimant 
to comply with the statutory requirement to verify his claim 
under oath. There was no allegation in either the third party 
complaint ( R. 8-13), nor in the supplemental third party 
complaint ( R. 104-106) which could have raised any issue of 
"waiver" of the notorious failure of Harris to verify the lien 
claim under oath. Nor was there any issue of "waiver" stated 
in the pre-trial order ( R. 125-127) . If there had been any 
issue of "waiver," no evidence was offered at the trial to 
prove any possible "waiver" chargeable to Zions Securities 
Corporation. Hanis created that fatal defect himself. He 
alleged nothing in his pleadings which would excuse his 
noncompliance with the statute, nor which could be con-
strued to constitute a "waiver" of any of the rights of Zions 
Securities Corporation. 
In American Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Blomquist, 21 Utah 
2d 289, 445 P. 2d 1, 3, this Court stated the rule that 
"waiver" is the intentional relinquishment of a known right 
with knowledge of its existence; that there must be an inten-
tion to relinquish the right. To the same effect is Waterway 
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Terminals Co. v. P. S. Lord Mechanical Contractors, 242 Or. 
1, 406 P. 2d 556, 557, 13 ALR 3rd 1. The court also stated 
that a party cannot be estopped by silence unless he has a 
legal duty to speak. There never was any issue of "waiver" by 
pleading or pre-trial order, nor any proof. One of the issues 
stated in the pre-trial order was whether the "Notice of 
Lien" was "void by reason of its not being verified." ( R. 126, 
172). 
In Valentine Lumber & Supply Co. v. Thibeaut, (Mass.), 
130 N. E. 2d 868, the statute required the statement of lien 
to be sworn to, and the master made a finding that such was 
<lone, but the copy referred to in the pleading indicated that 
it was not sworn to under oath. At page 872 the court said: 
" 
0 0 0 This was not the sworn statement required by 
the statute. Cook Borden & Co., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 
293 Mass. 174, 177, 179-181, 199 N. E. 551. Compare 
Jackman v. Glouster, 143 Mass. 390, 9 N. E. 740. Valen-
tine is bound by the allegations of its bill, including its 
allegation as to the form of the statement of the account. 
0 0 0 The result is that as the record stands, no lien is 
established." 
Zions repeatedly urged the defense of "failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted." Under Rule 12 (h) 
a party does not waive such defense, and such defense may 
be asserted "at the trial on the merits." The defect of failure 
to verify was one of substance and was incurable. It was pre-
judicial error for the rial court to attempt to excuse the ad-
mitted failure of Harris to comply with a basic requirement 
of the statute. It was prejudicial error to adjudge Harris to 
have a "valid lien" when the "Notice of Lien" was void on its 
face, and to refuse to dismiss the third party complaint for 
the incurable failure of Harris to state a claim for judicial 
relief. The h·ial court compounded the prejudicial error by 
foreclosing Zions Securities of all of its title and rights in the 
lands which never were improved nor enhanced in value. 
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CONCLUSION 
The lien statutes were enacted to prevent unjust enrich-
ment of a landowner whose land is benefited and improved 
as a result of materials and services furnished at his request 
or by direction of his authorized agents. Those statutes never 
were designed to enrich architects or any other persons un-
justly, who furnished the landowner nothing and whose land 
is not improved. In this case no building nor other improve-
ment was ever constructed upon the land of Zions Securities. 
Instead, the land was dis-improved by the ground-lessee, 
Artcol Corporation, on recommendation of the architect. 
The architects contracted exclusively with the ground-
lessee. They never entered into any contract with Zions 
Securities. They never acknowledged any obligations to the 
Landlord, Zions Securities. They furnished the Landlord 
nothing - not even copies of plans and specifications. They 
made no claim that Zions Securities promised to pay them 
anything. Zions Securities Corporation never became in-
debted to the architects jointly nor to Harris individually in 
any sum or amount. 
The "Foreclosure Decree and Judgment" against Zions 
Securities should be reversed in its entirety, for it is unsup-
ported by the evidence and is contrary to law. Zions Securi-
ties should be adjudged not to have become indebted to the 
architects or to either of them in any sum or amount. The 
unverified "Notice of Lien" filed by Harris alone on a non-
existing individual claim should be adjudged to be null and 
void, and a judgment in favor of appellant against respond-
ent Harris, of "no cause of action" should be entered to-
gether with appellant's costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McKAY and BURTON 
and 
PAUL E. REIMANN 
Attorneys for Zions Securities Corporation, 
Third-Party Defendant-Appellant. 
APPENDIX "A" 
(Excerpts from Exhibits 21, dated June 26, 1963) 
GROUND LEASE 
"NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises, 
and _of the mutual promises and agreements of the parties 
heremafter set forth, and for and in consideration of the 
rents, covenants, and agreements, by ARTCOL to be paid, 
kept, and performed, ZIONS does by these presents grant, 
lease, demise and let unto ARTCOL the above described 
tracts and parcels of land, -
"TO HA VE AND TO HOLD the said premises, together 
with the appurtenances to ARTCOL for a term of eighty-five 
( 85) years, commencing on the 16th day of June, 1963, and 
ending on the 15th day of June, 2048, at the hours of mid-
night of said date. 
"This Agreement of Lease is made strictly upon the cove-
nants, promises, stipulations, terms and conditions herein-
after set forth, and to that end for such purpose it is agreed 
as follows: 
"l. ARTCOL shall pay to ZIONS as annual rental for said 
premises the following sums: 
(a) For each of the first through the twenty-fifth years, 
$18,000.00. 
( b) For each of the twenty-sixth through the fortieth 
years, the lesser of $30,000.00 or 6% of the value of the land 
only, as appraised in A.D. 1988 (which rental shall in no 
event be less than $18,000.00). 
( c) For each of the forty-first through the fifty-fifth years, 
the lesser of $36,000.00 or 6% of the value of the land only 
as reappraised in A.D. 2003 (which rental shall in no event 
be less than $18,000.00). 
( d) For each of the fifty-sixth through the sixty-fifth 
years, 6% of the value of the land and building as reappraised 
in A. D. 2018, or $18,000.00, whichever is greater. 
( e) For each of the sixty-sixth through the seventy-fifth 
years, 6% of the value of the land and building, as reap-
praised in A. D. 2028, or $18,000.00, whichever is greater. 
( f) For each of the seventy-sixth the 
years, 6% of the value of the land and bmldmg, as reappraised 
in A. D. 2028, or $18,000.00, whichever is greater. 
"4. The demised premises shall not be used contrary to 
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the ordinances of Salt Lake City, State of Utah, to the laws 
of the State of Utah or of the United States of America, or to 
the valid regulations of any duly constituted regulatory or 
administrative body. No part of the premises which is open 
to the general public shall be used for the consumption of 
beer or intoxicating liquors. ARTCOL shall keep and main-
tain the premises in a clean and presentable condition and 
shall not commit any nuisance thereon nor permit any nui-
sance to be committed or to exist thereon. 
"7. ARTCOL, at its own cost and expense, may at its op-
tion, erect and construct a building or buildings, structure or 
structures, or other improvements on the demised premises 
which shall conform with all rules, regulations and ordinan-
ces of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Such construction 
shall be substantial and shall meet reasonable standard arch-
itectural and fire underwriters' requirements. All alterations 
and improvements to the building or buildings, structure or 
structures, erected on the demised premises shall be made 
at the expense of ARTCOL and shall be and become the 
property of ZIONS at the expiration or termination of this 
agreement of lease or any extension thereof. The foregoing 
provisions shall apply to any assignee or assignees, sublessee 
or sublessees of ARTCOL under this agreement. 
"8. ARTCOL shall not permit any lien to be filed against 
the demised premises for any work performed for ARTCOL 
or material furnished ARTCOL to remain unreleased for a 
period exceeding sixty ( 60) days; provided, however, noth-
ing herein contained shall prevent ARTCOL in good faith 
from contesting in the courts the claim or claims of any 
person or persons, partnerships or corporation, growing out 
of the erection, alteration, or modification of any buildings 
or buildings, structure or structures, or improvements on the 
demised premises, and the postponement of payment of such 
claim or claims until such contest shall finally be decided by 
the courts shall not be a violation of this Agreement of Lease 
or any covenant thereof. 
"9. ARTCOL shall pay all real estate taxes, special im-
provement assessments, license and all other ?overn-
mental charges which may be levied or assessed agamst the 
demised premises and improvements thereon and against the 
business conducted on the demised premises during the term 
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of _the Agreemei:it of Lease and any extension thereof, if any. 
Said taxes, special assessments and license fees shall be paid 
prior to the date of delinquency thereof, so that no tax sale 
nor special improvement assessment sale shall occur; pro-
vided, however, nothing herein contained shall prevent ART-
COL in good faith from contesting in the courts the validity 
of any such taxes, assessments, or license fees, and the post-
ponement of payment of such taxes, special assessments, and 
license fees until such contest shall be finally decided by the 
courts shall not be a violation of this Agreement of Lease or 
any covenant thereof. "' "' "' 
"' "' "' 
"15. Upon default in the payment of rent reserved to 
ZIONS hereunder for a period of thirty (30) days after due 
date thereof, the rent and charges due ZIONS shall become 
a lien upon the furniture, fixtures, and personal property of 
ARTCOL brought upon or used in connection with the de-
mised premises, and said furniture, fixtures and personal 
property shall not be removed from said demised premises 
until such rent and charges are paid in full. 
"16. Whenever ARTCOL shall not be in arrears of rent 
nor in default in the performance or observance of any of 
the covenants, provisions, or conditions of this Agreement of 
Lease, ARTCOL, or its assignees or sublessees, may mort-
gage its or their estate or its or their interest therein to secure 
a bona fide loan or loans of money then actually made or 
then actually about to be made to ARTCOL, or to its as-
signees or sublessees, or to extend or renew any mortgage so 
obtained; provided, however, that no mortgagee nor anyone 
who claims by, through, or under such mortgage shall by 
virtue of such mortgage acquire any greater or more ex-
tended rights than ARTCOLL has under this Agreement of 
Lease; and provided further, that any such mortgage and 
the rights and interests of the mortgagee and all persons who 
claim by, through or under such mortgage shall be in every 
respect subject, subservant, and subordinate to all the condi-
tions, provisions, stipulations, requirements, and 
obligations of this Agreement of Lease, and the nghts, 
powers, and privileges of ZIONS thereunder as well as in re-
spect of any building or buildings, shucture or shuctures, 
from time to time upon said demised premises; and provided 
further, that each and every person acquiring title under said 
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mortgage to the leasehold or interest created by this Agree-
ment of Lease in said demised premises shall be deemed ex-
pressly to have accepted all of the terms, covenants, condi-
tions, and agreements in this Agreement of Lease contained 
to be kept and performed by ARTCOL. ARTCOL covenants 
and agrees that excepting as aforesaid, and under the condi-
tions aforesaid, and excepting for the purpose aforesaid, it, 
or its assignees or sublessees, will not mortgage or encumber 
this lease or their interest acquired hereunder. ZIONS agrees 
that if the leasehold estate hereby demised shall be mort-
gaged by ARTCOL, or its assignees or sublessees, as herein 
provided, and if ZIONS shall be notified in writing of such 
mortgage or mortgages, and the name and address of the 
mortgagee or mortgagees, then notice of default in the per-
formance of the covenants in this Agreement of Lease con-
tained of the same kind and in the same manner and for the 
same length of time as are hereby required to be given to 
ARTCOL shall also be given such mortgagee or mortgagees. 
If ARTCOL does not give notice to ZIONS of such mortgage 
or mortgages, and the name and address of the mortgagee or 
mortgagees, there shall be no obligation upon ZIONS to give 
notice of default to said mortgagee or mortgagees. 
"17. The holder of any mortgage encumbering this lease, 
or the holder of any mortgage encumbering any sublease, 
and any sublessee or assignee from ARTCOL shall have the 
right in case ARTCOL shall make any default under this 
lease, to make good such default, whether the same consists 
of the failure to pay rent or the falure to perform any other 
matter or thing which ARTCOL is herein required expressly 
or by implication to do or perform, and ZIONS shall accept 
such performance on the part of the holder of any such mort-
gage or such sublessee or assignee as though the same had 
been done or performed by ARTCOL itself, but this provi-
sion shall not be deemed to give the holder of any such mort-
gage, sublease or assignment of lease any right or power to 
remedy or cure any default under this lease which ARTCOL 
would not have had under its provisions. 
"18. ZIONS agrees that in the event of a sale of this lease 
through foreclosure proceedings, the purchaser at such fore-
closure sale, or any subsequent holder of this lease throu!0 
such purchaser, shall have the same rights in and under this 
lease as ARTCOL has. 
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"26. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this lease, if 
and so long as this leasehold is subject to a mortgage insured 
reinsured, or held by the Federal Housing Commissioner o; 
given to the Commissioner in connection with a resale or the 
demised premises are acquired and held by him of a 
default under said mortgage, the TENANT is authorized to 
obtain a loan, the repayment of which is to be insured by the 
Federal Housing Commissioner and secured by a mortgage 
on this leasehold estate. TENANT is further authorized to 
execute a mortgage on this leasehold and otherwise to com-
ply with the requirements of the Federal Housing Commis-
sioner for obtaining such an insured mortgage loan; pro-
vided, however, that the LANDLORD shall not be required 
to mortgage the real property. 
"30. The LANDLORD agrees that, within ten ( 10) days 
after receipt of written request from TENANT, it will join in 
any and all applications for permits, licenses or other author-
izations required by any governmental or other body claim-
ing jurisdiction in connection with any work which the 
TENANT may do hereunder, and will also join in any grants 
for easements for electric, telephone, gas, water, sewer and 
such other public utilities and facilities as may be reasonably 
necessary in the operation of the demised premises or of any 
improvements that may be erected thereon; and if, at the 
expiration of such ten ( 10) days' period, the LANDLORD 
shall not have joined in any such application, or grants for 
casements, the TENANT shall have the right to execute 
such application and grants in the name of the LANDLORD, 
and, for that purpose, the LANDLORD hereby irrevocably 
appoints the TENANT as its Attorney-in-fact to execute such 
papers on behalf of the LANDLORD. 
"32. Upon any default under this Lease which authorizes 
the cancellation thereof by the LANDLORD, LANDLORD 
shall give notice to the mortgagee and the Federal Housing 
Commissioner, and the Mortgagee and the Federal Housing 
Commissioner, their successors and assigns, shall have the 
right within any time within six ( 6) months from the date of 
such notice to correct the default and reinstate the lease un-
less LANDLORD has first terminated the Lease as provided 
hnein." 
